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HE final decade of the twentieth century witnessed a sea change
in the economic legislation of Latin America. After surviving the
inefficiencies of state-controlled economies in the 1970s, followed
by the debt crisis and the ensuing economic stagnation throughout the
1980s, Latin America embarked on a path of rapid trade liberalization at
the beginning of the 1990s. In a trend that accelerated across the region
throughout the first half of the decade, country after country reduced im-
port tariffs, removed price controls and foreign exchange restrictions,
privatized state-owned businesses, and dismantled statutory barriers to
foreign investment. In their place, governments in the region began to
adopt new legislation or revive existing legislation that encouraged the
operation of free market principles. Foremost among the new laws were
those designed to foment and safeguard free competition. By the turn of
the century, all major, and several of the smaller, Latin American juris-
dictions had implemented competition laws and established agencies to
regulate and enforce them and many of these agencies have already as-
sumed visible roles in their domestic economies, censuring anticompeti-
tive practices and blocking or reshaping large business combinations.1
This article provides a brief overview of the competition laws in effect
in the major Latin American countries at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. It is intended to provide lawyers, whose practice includes advis-
Thomas W. Studwell is a partner in the New York office of Baker & McKenzie.
He acknowledges with gratitude the able assistance of Yasmin Roman, J. Carlos
Real, and Matthew Poulter in the preparation of this article.
1. Summaries of rulings and administrative actions of a number of countries, as well
as the text of the relevant laws and regulations, are available on the respective
competition agency's websites. See, e.g., Argentina, Comisi6n Nacional de Defensa
de la Competencia, at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/cndc/home.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2004); Brazil, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econdmica, at www.cade.gov.br
(last visited Nov. 3, 2004); Chile, Fiscalia Nacional Econ6mica de Chile, at http://
www.fne.cl/superior.html (last visited (Nov. 3, 2004); Mexico, Comisidn Federal de
la Competencia, at www.cfc.gob.mx/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2004); Peru, Instituto Na-
cional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Proteccion de la Propiedad Intelectual,
at www.indecopi.gob.pe/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2004); Venezuela, Superintendencia
para la Promocion y Proteccion de la Libre Competencia, at www.procompetencia.
gov.ve (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
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ing on transactions, investments, or trade in the region, a practical guide
to Latin American competition law. It does not, however, present an in-
depth analysis of the competition law of any single jurisdiction or a com-
parative study of the various laws of the region and their diverse theoreti-
cal underpinnings. It is similarly not intended to serve as a substitute for
the advice of local counsel with respect to the content or application of
any particular law or regulation.
Specifically, this article reviews the competition laws that are now in
effect in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Vene-
zuela. These jurisdictions were chosen primarily for the size of their do-
mestic economies and their respective volumes of international trade and
inbound direct investment. While other countries in the region have
adopted similar legislation, 2 and certain regional legislative initiatives are
currently under way as well, 3 they are beyond the scope of the present
article.
For each jurisdiction, this article examines the statutory treatment of
two broad areas addressed by competition law: (1) anticompetitive con-
duct in the marketplace; and (2) mergers, acquisitions, and other business
concentrations. Although these regulations are of primary concern to do-
mestic enterprises, they can also be important to international counsel in
at least two ways. First, the business practices of multinational subsidiar-
ies are subject to the antitrust restrictions that now govern in the jurisdic-
tions examined herein. An important role of international compliance
officers in large corporations is to monitor compliance of the corpora-
tion's far-flung affiliates with the competition laws of their jurisdiction of
operations. Knowledge of these laws is imperative. Second, the laws of
many countries purport to apply directly to agreements or concerted ac-
tions of multinational companies that are made or taken outside of the
country if the agreement or action has an anticompetitive effect in the
country. 4 While the principal types of restricted conduct, not surpris-
ingly, are much the same across the region - to wit, price fixing, market
division, limitation of production, bid rigging, and tying - the countries
2. See Constituci6n Politica del Estado arts. 134, 142, 233 (Bol.); Ley de Inversiones,
Law No. 1182 of Sept. 17, 1990 (Bol.); Promocion de la Competencia y Defensa
Efectiva del Consumidor y su Reglamento, Law No. 7472 of Dec. 20, 1994 (Costa
Rica); Constitucitn de la Republica Dominicana art. 8 (12); CODIGO PENAL arts.
419-20 (Dom. Rep.); Normas Sobre la Defensa de la Competencia, Law No. 29 of
Feb. 1, 1996 (Pan.); Servicios Publicos y Privados, Seguridad Publica y Condiciones
en las que se Desarrollan las Actividades Productivas, Law No. 17.243 of June 29,
2000, arts. 13-15 (Uru.); Presupuesto Nacional, Law No. 17.296 of Feb. 21, 2001,
arts. 157 - 58 (Uru.); Decreto sobre Defensa de la Competencia of Mar. 15, 2001
(Uru.).
3. See Andean Group: Commission Decision 285 - Norms to Prevent or Correct
Competitive Distortions Caused by Practices that Restrict Free Competition, Mar.
21, 1991, 32 I.L.M. 162; Protocol VIII: Competition Policy, Consumer Protection,
Dumping and Subsidies (Protocol Amending the Treaty Establishing the Carib-
bean Community), Mar. 14, 2000, at www.caricom.org/archives/protocolviii.htm.
4. For a discussion of the extraterritorial prosecution of price-fixing, see Donald C.
Klawiter, Cartel Enforcement in the Post-ADM, Post-Enron World, in ANTITRUST
REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS 2003 6 (4th ed. 2002).
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differ as to whether particular conduct is illegal per se or rather, if it is
illegal only if it has an anticompetitive effect. This difference is attributa-
ble at least in part to the antitrust law -that of the United States or the
European Community - that has had the most influence on the legisla-
tion of the country in question.
5
It is perhaps in the area of merger controls that the antitrust laws in
Latin America have changed most dramatically over the past decade. At
the beginning of the 1990s, lawyers representing a company planning a
merger, acquisition, joint venture, or other business combination in the
Latin American region had little cause for concern that the proposed
transaction might violate local competition laws. Ten years later, how-
ever, one of the same lawyer's first, and most important, responsibilities
is to examine possible consequences under the antitrust laws of each ju-
risdiction in which the transaction is likely to have an effect. As will be
seen, the majority of the Latin American jurisdictions now require some
form of notification or approval for most sizeable business
concentrations.
II. ARGENTINA
A. LEGISLATION AND SCOPE
Although Argentine antitrust law dates back to the early decades of
the twentieth century, the first modern antitrust legislation, Law 22,262,
was enacted in 1980 to prohibit acts or conduct that limit, restrict, or dis-
tort competition or market access, or constitute an abuse of a dominant
market position. 6 In 1999, Law 22,262 was replaced by Law 25,156, the
Defense of Competition Act (the Act), which introduced major changes,
particularly the establishment of merger control rules and the creation of
a National Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) that has the power to re-
solve conflicts and impose sanctions.7 The Act applies to individuals or
legal entities carrying out economic activities in Argentina, and those per-
forming such activities outside the country, insofar as their acts, activities,
or agreements produce effects in the Argentine market.8
B. REGULATED CONDUCT
The Act prohibits the following conduct to the extent that it has, as its
purpose or effect, limitation, restriction, or distortion of competition or if
it constitutes an abuse of a dominant market position:
5. See Shanker A. Singham, Shaping Competition Policy in the Americas: Scope for
Transatlantic Cooperation?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363 (1998).
6. Law No. 22.262, Aug. 1, 1980 (Arg.), available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/scripts
l/busquedas/cnsnorma.asp?tipo=Ley&nro=22262.
7. Law No. 25.156, art. 58, Sept. 16, 1999, 29233 B.O. 5, amended by Decree No. 396/
2001, Apr. 1, 2001 (Arg.), available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/txtnorma/60016.
htm. The law provides that, until the Tribunal is established and operating, its
functions will be carried out by the existing antitrust agency, the Comisi6n Na-
cional de Defensa de la Competencia. Id. art. 58.
8. Id. art. 3.
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(a) the direct or indirect fixing, agreement, or manipulation of the
price of goods or services, or the exchange of information for the same
purpose or having the same effect;
(b) the establishing of obligations to limit the production, processing,
distribution, purchase or marketing of goods, or the quantity, volume, or
frequency of services;
(c) the horizontal division among competitors of territories, markets,
customers, or sources of supply;
(d) the agreement or coordination of bids in auctions or competitive
bidding procedures;
(e) concerted action to limit or control technical development or in-
vestments for the production or marketing of goods and services;
(f) the impeding or exclusion of third parties from entering or remain-
ing in any market;
(g) the direct or indirect fixing or imposition, in concert with competi-
tors or individually, in any manner, of prices and conditions for the
purchase or sale of goods, services, or production;
(h) the control of markets for goods or services, through agreements to
limit or control research and development or the production of goods or
performance of services, or to impede investments in the production or
distribution of goods and services;
(i) the subordination of the sale of a good or rendering of a service to
the acquisition of another;
(j) the conditioning of a sale or purchase upon an undertaking not to
use, acquire, sell or supply goods or services produced, processed, distrib-
uted, or marketed by third parties;
(k) the imposition of discriminatory conditions, not based on custom-
ary market practice, on the acquisition or disposition of goods and
services;
(1) the unjustified refusal to accept firm offers for the sale or purchase
of goods and services on market terms and conditions;
(m) the suspension of a dominant monopolistic service to a provider of
public services or public interest; or
(n) the selling of products below cost, without a basis in customary
market practice, in order to eliminate a competitor in the marketplace or
to damage the image, assets or brand value of providers of goods or
services. 9
C. MERGER CONTROLS
The Act also prohibits economic concentrations that have the purpose
or effect of reducing, restricting, or distorting competition in a manner
that could damage the general economic interest.10 For these purposes,
an economic concentration is the acquisition of control of one or more
9. Id. art. 2.
10. Id. art. 7.
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enterprises by means of: (1) merger; (2) transfer of a going concern;
(3) transfer of shares or rights giving the acquiror control of, or substan-
tial influence over, the issuer; or (4) any other act or agreement that
transfers the assets of an enterprise to one person or economic group or
gives such person or group management control of the enterprise. I
Economic concentrations must be reported to the National Competi-
tion Tribunal if the business volume of the combined entities within Ar-
gentina exceeds P$200,000,000 (approximately US$69,444,000).12 Certain
transactions are exempt, including: (1) the acquisition of an enterprise of
which the acquiror already holds more than 50 percent of the stock;
(2) the acquisition of a single Argentine entity by a single foreign entity
that did not previously own assets or shares in other Argentine compa-
nies; and (3) an acquisition exceeding the threshold, where the acquiror
has not completed any acquisition in the same market within the preced-
ing twelve months having an aggregate value exceeding P$20,000,000 (ap-
proximately US$6,944,400) or within the preceding thirty-six months,
having an aggregate value exceeding P$60,000,000 (approximately
US$20,833,000). 13 If the parties involved in a transaction that is subject
to notification fail to notify the Tribunal, the transaction will have no le-
gal effect between the parties or against third parties. 14 Moreover, a
party who fails to comply with the notification requirement is subject to a
fine of up to P$1,000,000 (approximately US$347,000) per day until com-
pliance. 15 Once the Tribunal has been notified, it has forty-five days
within which: (1) to approve the transaction; (2) to condition the transac-
tion on compliance with certain requirements; or (3) to prohibit the trans-
action. If the Tribunal does not do any of these, the transaction will be
deemed approved.16
The parties to a transaction must notify the Tribunal by submitting a
completed questionnaire in which the parties provide financial and back-
ground information about the parties, the main characteristics of the
transaction, a description of the products and relevant markets, informa-
tion about substitute products, and manufacturing process information. 17
In addition, the parties must provide in-depth quantitative market infor-
mation, including the market shares of the parties involved, supply and
competitive studies, strategic plans and reports, profitability reports,
qualitative market data and projections, production costs, and potential
efficiency gains. ' 8
11. Id. art. 6.
12. Id. art. 8. All U.S. dollar equivalents stated in this article are based on currency
conversion rates in effect in January 2004.
13. Id. art. 10.
14. Id. art. 8.
15. Id. art. 46(d).
16. Id. arts. 13-14.
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D. SANCTIONS
Sanctions for violations of the Act include:
(a) cease and desist orders;
(b) fines ranging from P$10,000 (approximately US$3,470) to
P$150,000,000 (approximately US$52,083,000), taking into account:
(1) the losses incurred by all those affected by the prohibited activity;
(2) the benefits obtained by those involved in the prohibited activity;
(3) the value of the assets of those persons involved in the prohibited
activity at the time of the infraction; and (4) whether it is a first or repeat
violation - in the case of the latter, the fine will be doubled;
(c) in cases of abuse of a dominant market position or acquisition or
consolidation of a monopoly, the Tribunal can impose conditions upon
the behavior of the culpable party to neutralize the practices that distort
competition, or to request a competent authority to order the dissolution,
liquidation, or division of the entity or entities at fault; or
(d) fines of up to P$1,000,000 (approximately US$347,000) for failure
to give merger notification or to abide by certain prejudgment orders set
by the Tribunal.' 9
E. ENFORCEMENT
The Tribunal is the primary enforcement body under the Act. Article
24 of the Act authorizes the Tribunal to carry out studies, take testimony,
perform investigations, hold hearings, and impose sanctions. 20 In addi-
tion, the regulations issued under the Act provide that the Secretaria Na-
cional de Defensa a la Competencia (the Competition Secretariat) is the
agency that represents the public interest in proceedings before the Tribu-
nal, with the authority to, inter alia, conduct certain investigations, re-
quest provisional remedies, and file appeals. 2 '
III. BRAZIL
A. LEGISLATION AND SCOPE
Brazil's competition legislation is embodied principally in Law 8884 of
June 11, 1994, as amended (Law 8884).22 Law 8884 was enacted as part
of Brazil's conversion in the last decade from a closed, state-controlled
economy to one based on free-market principles. Although prior to that
time, Brazilian law recognized certain broad principles of fair competi-
tion, and in fact, the Economic Defense Administrative Council (CADE)
had been in existence since 1962, the legal protection of economic compe-
19. Law No. 25.156, art. 46.
20. Id. art. 24.
21. Decree No. 89/2001, art. 26, Jan. 25, 2001, 29577 B.O. 1 (Arg.), available at http://
infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/txtnorma/65959.htm.
22. Lei No. 8.884, de 11 de junho de 1994, amended by Lei No. 9.069/95, Lei No. 9.021/
95, Lei No. 9.470/97, Lei No. 9.781/99, Lei No. 9.873/99 & Lei No. 10.149, de 21 de
dezembro de 2000, D.O.U. de 21.12.2000, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/.
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tition had not played a significant role in the Brazilian economy because
effective competition was not practicable at that time. Law 8884 prohib-
its a broad range of anticompetitive conduct, and has transformed CADE
into an autonomous, governmental agency with substantial authority to
prevent and prosecute anticompetitive behavior and regulate business
concentrations. 23
B. REGULATED CONDUCT
Law 8884 broadly prohibits all formg of conduct that has the aim or
potential effect, even if not attained, of: (1) limiting or prejudicing free
competition; (2) dominating the relevant markets of good and services;
(3) increasing profits arbitrarily; or (4) abusing a dominant market posi-
tion. Generally, a company or group is presumed to have a dominant
position if it controls 20 percent or more of the relevant market.24 The
law identifies a number of acts that are prohibited if they fall within any
of these four types of conduct. A partial list includes acts:
(a) to fix prices and conditions for the sale of a certain product or ser-
vice in collusion with competitors;
(b) to obtain or otherwise procure the adoption of uniform or con-
certed business practices among competitors;
(c) to apportion markets for products or services, or for sources of raw
materials or intermediary products;
(d) to limit or restrain market access by new companies;
(e) to create barriers to the establishment, operation, or development
of a competitor company or a supplier, purchaser, or financier of a cer-
tain product or service;
(f) to bar access of competitors to sources of raw materials, equipment,
or technology sources, or to channels of distribution thereof;
(g) to require or grant exclusivity in mass media advertising;
(h) to agree in advance on prices or advantages in public or adminis-
trative biddings;
(i) to control the market for a certain product or service by means of
agreements to limit or control technological research and development or
the production of products or services, or to limit investments in the pro-
duction of products and services or the distribution thereof;
(j) to impose prices or other terms or conditions of sale on distributors,
retailers, or representatives of products or services;
(k) to discriminate against purchasers or suppliers of a certain product
or service by establishing price differentials or discriminatory conditions
of sale;
(1) to refuse to sell a certain product or service in accordance with reg-
ular business practices and policies;
(m) to sell products below cost without justification; and
23. See id.
24. Id. art. 20.
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(n) to condition the sale of one product or service on the acquisition of
another. 25
C. MERGER CONTROLS
With respect to merger controls, Law 8884 requires that any acts that
may limit or restrain free competition or result in the control of a relevant
market, be submitted to CADE for review. 26 This includes acts intended
to increase economic concentration, such as mergers, acquisitions, and
joint ventures, where: (1) the combined entity would control 20 percent
or more of the relevant market; or (2) any of the parties has annual
worldwide gross revenues, according to its most recent balance sheet, of
R$400,000,000 (approximately US$141,343,000) or more.27 CADE has
interpreted the R$400,000,000 threshold as applying to the revenues of
the entire corporate group to which the respective party belongs, even if
members of the group are located outside of Brazil. 28 Law 8884 applies
to acts wholly or partially performed in Brazil, or which have or may have
effects in Brazil.2 9 Consequently, the law would be deemed to apply to a
merger or acquisition involving two non-Brazilian companies, if one or
both of them have subsidiaries, branches, or business operations in Brazil,
so long as one of the parties meets the revenue threshold.
Filing with CADE is required no later than fifteen days after the trans-
action date.30 CADE has interpreted the transaction date as the date of
signing of the "first binding document" between the parties, but has not
defined binding document for this purpose. 3' Some commentators rec-
ommend that parties adopt a conservative interpretation, and assume
that any document, including a letter-of intent or memorandum of under-
standing which contains language that could even remotely be considered
binding, will constitute a binding document for CADE filing purposes. 32
Failure to file may result in fines ranging from 60,000 UFIR (Unidades
Fiscais de Referencia) to 6,000,000 UFIR (approximately US$22,560 to
US$2,256,000). 3 3
Law 8884 further requires the parties that are involved in a reportable
transaction, to submit certain documents and information to the Secreta-
riat of Economic Rights (SDE), which provides copies to CADE and to
the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (SEAE). If the transaction is
not complex, the only documents the parties must submit are a power of
attorney, all relevant binding agreements, and any subsequent agree-
25. Id. art. 21.
26. Id. art. 54.
27. Id. art. 54, § 3.
28. THE GLOBAL MERGER NOTIFICATION HANDBOOK 149 (David J. Laing et al., eds.,
Cameron May 3d ed. 2002).
29. Lei No. 8.884, art. 2.
30. Id. art. 54, § 4.
31. Resoluqdo No. 15, de 19 de agosto de 1998, D.O.U. de 28.08.1998, available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/.
32. The GLOBAL MERGER NOTIFICATION HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 149-150.
33. Lei No. 8.884, art. 54, § 5.
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ments that formalized the transaction. If these documents are written in
a foreign language, the parties must submit Portuguese translations. If
the SDE considers the transaction to be complex, the parties must pro-
vide detailed financial and background information about themselves,
their parent companies, the transaction in question, and the relevant
product markets. 34
CADE has 120 days from the date of filing to issue its approval or
denial of the transaction, during the first sixty days of which CADE re-
ceives advisory opinions from SDE and SEAE.35 This period may be
extended if CADE requests further information. If CADE denies ap-
proval of the transaction, it is empowered, if the transaction has already
been consummated, to order measures to cure the economic harm caused
by the transaction, including the partial or complete unwinding of the
transaction, the spin-off or sale of assets, and the cessation of infringing
activities. 36
D. SANCTIONS
Violators of Law 8884 are subject to the sanctions specified therein in
Article 23. The sanctions include the following:
(a) for companies, a fine equaling the greater of 1 to 30 percent of the
company's gross pre-tax revenue as of the latest financial statements, or
the profit obtained from the underlying violation;
(b) for managers directly or indirectly liable for their company's viola-
tion, a fine from 10 to 15 percent of the fine imposed on the company;
(c) for individuals, when not feasible to use the gross revenues, a fine
ranging from 6,000 to 6,000,000 UFIR (approximately US$2,250 to
US$2,256,000). 37
Furthermore, fines are doubled for repeated violations.
Article 24 of Law 8884 also provides for the following sanctions when-
ever the gravity of the violation or public interest requires:
(a) a half-page notice in the publication of the court's choosing for two
consecutive days, published for one to three consecutive weeks, at the
violator's expense;
(b) ineligibility for official financing or participation in bidding
processes involving the federal, state, municipal, or Federal District au-
thorities for a period of five years or more;
(c) publication of the violator's name on the Brazilian Consumer Pro-
tection List; or
(d) the partial suspension of the company's activities. 38
34. For a more detailed list of required items, see THE GLOBAL MERGER NOTIFICA-
TION HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 150.
35. Lei No. 8.884, art. 54, § 6.
36. Id. § 9.
37. Id. art. 23; THE GLOBAL MERGER NOTIFICATION HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at
150.
38. Lei No. 8.884, art. 24.
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E. ENFORCEMENT
In addition to CADE, two other governmental bodies are involved in
enforcing Brazilian competition law: (1) SDE, an agency of the Ministry
of Justice, is involved in the investigation process; and (2) SEAE, an
agency of the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for issuing economic
opinions. The findings of the SDE and the SEAE are not binding on
CADE.39
In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of
CADE decisions associated with the new competitive environment. For
instance, from 1999 to 2000, the number of cases decided by CADE in-
creased by 67 percent. Moreover, cases involving merger controls have
recently come to dominate CADE's caseload - to wit, while non-merger
control cases represented 77 percent of all antitrust cases during the pe-
riod from 1996 through 1998, 82 percent of the cases decided by CADE in
2001, were merger control cases. 40
IV. CHILE
A. LEGISLATION AND SCOPE
Chile's competition policy is embodied in Decree No. 211 of 1973, as
amended and restated by Decree No. 511 of 1980, and further amended
in 1999 and 2002 (Decree 211). 4 1 Decree 211 prohibits all acts and agree-
ments that tend to impede free competition.42 To implement and enforce
that principle, Decree 211 created Regional and Central Preventative
Commissions, as competition authorities of first instance, and a
Resolutory Commission, as the final competition arbiter.43 Decree 211
also established the National Economic Prosecutor's Office, which is re-
sponsible for bringing criminal prosecutions for violations of it. 44
B. REGULATED CONDUCT
Decree 211 identifies the following as acts or agreements that tend to
impede free competition:
39. Id. arts. 3-14.
40. Gesner Oliveira, Antitrust Policy in Brazil: Recent Trends and Challenges Ahead, 4
ECON. PERSP., Feb. 1999, at 23, 23 (1999), at http:Ilusinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/
0299/ijeelijee0299.htm; THE GLOBAL MERGER NOTIFICATION HANDBOOK, supra
note 28, at 148.
41. Decree No. 211 of Dec. 22, 1973 (Chile), amended by Decree No. 511 of Oct. 27,
1980 (Chile), Law No. 19,610 of May 19, 1999 (Chile), & Law No. 19,806 of May
31, 2002 (Chile).
42. Id. tit. I, art. 1.
43. Id. art. 6.
44. Id. tits. II, IV. In May 2002, a bill was presented to the Senate that would amend
Decree 211 by, inter alia, eliminating the Preventative Commissions and replacing
the Resolutory Commission with a new Competition Defense Tribunal. A text of
the bill is available on the website of Fiscalia Nacional Economica de Chile (the
National Economic Prosecutor's Office), at www.fne.cl.
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(a) those relating to production, such as quotas, reductions or
suspensions;
(b) those relating to transportation;
(c) those relating to marketing or distribution, wholesale, or retail,
such as quotas, market division, and exclusive distribution arrangements;
(d) those involving the determination of prices of goods or services;
(e) those affecting the right to work or the freedom of workers to or-
ganize, assemble, or negotiate collectively; and
(f) generally, any arbitrary act or agreement having the purpose of
eliminating, restricting, or impeding competition.4
5
C. MERGER CONTROLS
While Decree 211 does not expressly regulate mergers, acquisitions,
joint ventures, or other business combinations or establish mandatory
pre- or post-merger notice requirements, those transactions that have sig-
nificant anticompetitive effects may nevertheless violate Decree 211, and
thus, be subject to sanctions thereunder, including fines, remedial mea-
sures, and even criminal prosecution. For this reason, parties to large
business combinations, particularly in critical economic sectors, occasion-
ally seek advisory opinions from Chile's antitrust authorities. Because
such a request may trigger a lengthy investigation by the authorities, with
a consequent delay of the transaction, however, it is advisable to consult
with knowledgeable counsel before proceeding, as the likelihood of ap-
proval or denial depends on the size, complexity, and potential effects of
each transaction.
D. SANCTIONS
Decree 211 contemplates various remedies for violations of its compe-
tition policy. Depending on the nature of the conduct or agreement in
question, the antitrust authorities may: (1) order the modification, sus-
pension, or termination of the agreement; (2) temporarily freeze prices of
the goods or services involved; (3) order the dissolution or modification
of the bylaws of one or more of the parties; (4) bar individual violators
from holding executive positions; (5) impose fines of up to 10,000 Tax
Units (Unidades Tributarias) (approximately US$518,800); 46 and
(6) bring criminal proceedings against the violators. 47
E. ENFORCEMENT
Chile's Preventative Commissions, Resolutory Commission, and Na-
tional Economic Prosecutor's Office have been actively enforcing Decree
211 in the thirty years since its enactment. Their proceedings, decisions
and resolutions concerning regulated conduct, published periodically by
45. Decree No. 211, tit. I, art. 2.
46. The Unidad Tributaria is approximately P$29,800 at this writing.
47. Decree No. 211, art. 17.
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A. LEGISLATION AND SCOPE
Colombia's primary antitrust statute is Law 155 of December 24, 1959,
as amended to date (Law 155), which prohibits all "contracts or agree-
ments which directly or indirectly have the purpose of limiting produc-
tion, supply, distribution or consumption of raw materials, products,
merchandise or services, national or foreign, and, in general, all types of
practices, procedures or systems tending to limit free competition and
maintain or determine inequitable prices."'49 In addition, Columbia has
issued a number of additional laws, rules, and regulations to implement
and supplement the provisions of Law 155, particularly Decree 1302 of
1964 (Decree 1302),50 Decree 2153 of 1992 (Decree 2153), 5 and Superin-
tendent of Industry and Trade Circular Letter 10 of 2001 (Circular 10).52
B. REGULATED CONDUCT
Decree 2153 prohibits contracts, agreements, concerted practices, or
conscious parallel conduct among two or more enterprises if they have as
their purpose or effect:
(a) fixing prices directly or indirectly;
(b) establishing discriminatory sale or marketing conditions for third
parties;
(c) dividing markets among producers or distributors;
(d) assigning production or supply quotas;
(e) assigning, dividing, or restricting sources of supply of resources;
(f) limiting technical development;
(g) conditioning the supply of a product upon the acceptance of addi-
tional obligations extraneous to the purpose of the transaction;
(h) withholding production of goods or services or affecting their level
of production; and
(i) collusion or price fixing in bidding or allocating contract awards. 53
Decree 2153 also proscribes: (1) the violation of consumer protection
rules regarding advertising; (2) influencing an enterprise to increase the
prices of its goods or services or to desist from lowering such prices; (3)
the refusal to sell to an enterprise or discriminate against an enterprise in
retaliation against its pricing policies; and (4) the abuse of a dominant
48. See generally Fiscalia Nacional Economica de Chile website, supra note 44.
49. Law No. 155 of Dec. 24, 1959, art. 1 (Col.).
50. Decree No. 1302 of June 1, 1964 (Col.).
51. Decree No. 2153 of Dec. 30, 1992 (Col.).
52. External Circular No. 10 of July 19, 2001 (Col.).
53. Decree No. 2153, art. 47.
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position in a market.54
With respect to the last proscription, an enterprise has a dominant posi-
tion if it is able to dictate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions
of the market.55 The following conduct constitutes abuse of a dominant
position:
(a) predatory pricing, that is, the reduction of prices below cost for the
purpose of eliminating, or preventing the entrance or expansion of, one
or more competitors;
(b) applying discriminatory terms among comparable suppliers or
comparable customers to the disadvantage of one of them;
(c) conditioning the supply of a product upon the acceptance of addi-
tional obligations extraneous to the purpose of the transaction;
(d) selling to one buyer on terms different from those offered to an-
other, for the purpose of reducing or eliminating competition; or
(e) selling the same product or service at different prices in different
regions of Colombia with the purpose or effect of reducing or eliminating
competition, when the price differential does not reflect a variation in the
costs of the transaction. 56
C. MERGER CONTROLS
Colombia's antitrust legislation requires companies engaged in the
same activity of production, supply, distribution, or consumption of a
given raw material, product, merchandise, or service to notify the Super-
intendent of Industry and Trade (the Superintendent) of any proposed
merger, consolidation, integration, or acquisition of control of enterprises
if: (1) the combined business would represent more than 20 percent of the
relevant market, measured in terms of annual sales for the year preceding
the year of the transaction; or (2) their combined assets, as of the date of
the transaction, exceed 50,000 minimum monthly wage (MMW) (approxi-
mately US$6,065,000). 57 The filing must be made before the closing of
the transaction and must include detailed information regarding the par-
ties, the transaction, the relevant market, supply and distribution chan-
nels, and other related matters. 58 The Superintendent thereafter has
thirty days within which to object to the transaction. If that period ex-
pires without any objection by the Superintendent, the parties may pro-
ceed to close the transaction.59
The parties to a qualified transaction must submit a merger notification
to the Superintendent. This notification must contain a detailed descrip-
tion of the goods and services that each of the parties involved in the
54. Id. art. 48.
55. Id. art. 45(5).
56. Id. art. 50.
57. External Circular No. 10, §§ 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. The minimum monthly wage for 2003
is P$332,000.
58. Id. § 2.1.2.
59. Law No. 155 of Dec. 24, 1959, art. 4, § 2 (Col.); Decree No. 1302 of June 1, 1964,
art. 6, (Col.).
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transaction produces, imports, distributes, or provides. In addition, the
parties must provide a description of the uses of the products, a list of the
markets served by the parties, the methods used by each party for trans-
portation, distribution, and sale of the products, and information relating
to the competitors of the parties.
60
D. SANCTIONS
The Superintendent is empowered to impose fines of up to 2,000
MMW (approximately US$242,600) upon companies that violate the
competition legislation, and fines of up to 300 MMW (approximately
US$36,400) upon managers, directors, legal representatives, and other
parties who authorize, execute, or tolerate such violations. 61 The Super-
intendent also has the authority to order the rectification, suspension, or
termination of infringing conduct or agreements.
E. ENFORCEMENT
The Superintendent is responsible for monitoring compliance with the
provisions governing free competition. It is responsible for the imposi-
tion of fines and for issuing cease and desist orders. 62 In addition, the
Office of the Superintendent provides direct assistance to the public by
answering inquiries from the general public concerning application of the
rules and regulations. 63
VI. MEXICO
A. LEGISLATION AND SCOPE
While Mexico enacted its first antitrust statute in the 1930s, competi-
tion laws were rarely enforced in Mexico until the enactment of the Fed-
eral Law of Economic Competition (the Competition Law), which
entered into effect on June 22, 1993.64 The stated purpose of the Compe-
tition Law is to protect the process of competition through the prevention
and elimination of monopolies, monopolistic practices, and other restric-
tions on the efficient operation of the markets for goods and services. 65
The law regulates monopolistic practices and economic concentrations
and creates a Federal Competition Commission (the Commission) that
has broad investigative and enforcement powers.66
60. THE GLOBAL MERGER NOTIFICATION HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 214.
61. Decree No. 2153 of Dec. 30, 1992, art. 4 (Col.).
62. Id. art. 11.
63. Id. §§ 11, 13.
64. "'Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica," D.O., 24 de diciembre de 1992 (Mex.),
translated at http://rO.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/Laws/Mexico.pdf [hereinafter
Competition Law].
65. Id. art. 2.
66. Id.
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B. REGULATED CONDUCT
The Competition Law prohibits monopolies and conduct that "dimin-
ish, impair or prevent competition and free participation in the produc-
tion, processing, distribution, and marketing of goods and services. 6 7
Monopolistic practices are divided into absolute and relative monopolis-
tic practices. 68 Absolute monopolistic practices are defined as agree-
ments or arrangements among competitors that have the purpose or
effect of: (1) fixing prices; (2) limiting production or distribution; (3) di-
viding markets; or (4) rigging public bids. Such agreements and arrange-
ments are null and void. 69
Relative monopolistic practices are prohibited only if the actor has
"substantial power" over the "relevant market. °70 The latter terms are
defined by reference to the presence of certain factors detailed in the
Competition Law, including substitutability of goods, distribution and in-
put costs, market share, and the existence of market barriers. 7 1 Relative
monopolistic practices are agreements or combinations that have the pur-
pose or effect of unduly impeding market access to third parties or giving
exclusive advantages to certain persons, in the following cases: 72
(a) between non-competitors: (1) the establishment of exclusive distri-
bution arrangements, whether based on subject matter, geographic terri-
tories or time periods, including the allocation of customers or suppliers;
and (2) the imposition of obligations not to compete;
(b) the imposition of price or other conditions that distributors or sup-
pliers must observe upon resale of goods or provision of services;
(c) tying arrangements;
(d) the conditions of sales or other transactions on obligations not to
deal with certain third parties;
(e) the refusal to deal with certain parties; and
(f) concerted action to pressure or retaliate against customers or
suppliers.
C. MERGER CONTROLS
Restricted economic concentrations are defined as mergers, acquisi-
tions, or other business combinations among or between any persons or
enterprises, whether competitors or not, having the purpose or effect of
diminishing, damaging, or impeding competition in identical, similar, or
substantially related goods or services. 73 The Competition Law identifies
certain factors that the Commission must consider in determining
whether a concentration violates this prohibition, such as the likely mar-
67. Id. art. 8.
68. Id. arts. 9-10.
69. Id. art. 9.
70. Id. art. 11(I).
71. Id. arts. 11-13.
72. Id. art. 10.
73. Id. art. 16.
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ket power or price-fixing abilities of the resulting concentration.7 4 The
Commission has the power to condition its approval of a proposed con-
centration on the restructuring of the transaction to avoid anticompetitive
consequences, and it is also empowered to undo prohibited
concentrations.7 5
Proposed concentrations meeting the following monetary thresholds
must be brought to the attention of the Commission prior to their
consummation:
(a) transactions having a value in excess of twelve million times the
daily minimum wage for the Federal District (DMW), or approximately
US$48,366,000;76
(b) transactions involving the accumulation of more than 35 percent of
the assets or shares of a person or enterprise with assets or sales exceed-
ing 12 million DMW (approximately US$48,366,000); or
(c) transactions involving persons or enterprises whose combined as-
sets or yearly sales exceed 48 million DMW (approximately
US$193,463,000) and an accumulation of assets or capital exceeding 4.8
million DMW (approximately US$19,346,300). 77
The Commission has a period of forty-five calendar days from the date
of the notice or from such later date on which any additional requested
information was received, in which to respond. If the Commission does
not respond during such forty-five day period, the transaction is deemed
approved. 78
Although there is no strict format for the notification, the Commission
prepared a questionnaire to guide the parties. Many companies prepare
a formal letter describing the transaction and attach the completed ques-
tionnaire and other required documents: The parties must submit certi-
fied copies of their by-laws and articles of incorporation, a power of
attorney of their legal representatives, and financial statements for the
previous fiscal year. They must also submit information showing capital
structure and stock participation of each shareholder before and after the
transaction, a description of the concentration's objectives and legal ac-
tions involved, the names of all persons or companies involved in the
transaction, a description of the goods and services of each party (includ-
ing their market shares), the names and market shares of international
and Mexican competitors, and the location of the facilities and distribu-
tion centers of the parties involved. 79
74. Id. arts. 17-18.
75, Id.
76. The DMW is 43.65 Pesos as of January 1, 2003.
77. Competition Law, art. 20.
78. Id.
79. THE GLOBAL MERGER NOTIFICATION HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 514.
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D. SANCTIONS
The Commission is empowered to levy fines of up to 1,500 DMW (ap-
proximately US$6,050) per day, for noncompliance with the Commis-
sion's orders. 80 In addition to being obligated to cease the prohibited
practices or divest prohibited concentrations, violators may also be sub-
ject to civil and criminal penalties, including fines in the following
amounts:
8 1
(a) up to 375,000 DMW (approximately US$1,511,400) for absolute
monopolistic practices;
(b) up to 225,000 DMW (approximately US$906,900) for prohibited
relative monopolistic practices or prohibited economic concentrations;
(c) up to 100,000 DMW (approximately US$403,000) for failure to
provide the Commission with prior notice of economic concentrations,
where required;
(d) up to 7,500 DMW (approximately US$30,200) for individuals di-
rectly participating in prohibited monopolistic practices or concentrations
in their capacity as representatives of legal entities; and
(e) in serious cases of any of the above violations, the higher of 10
percent of the violator's annual sales or 10 percent of its assets.
The Competition Law also gives private parties an express right of ac-
tion to bring ordinary civil suits for damages. 82 In order to be able to
bring such an action, however, the plaintiff must have previously given
evidence of its alleged damages in the administrative proceedings before
the Commission. The judge may consider the Commission's estimation of
the plaintiff's alleged damages. The Competition Law expressly denies
any private right to bring a judicial or administrative action based on the
Competition Law (that is, alleging damages due to violations thereof),
except for the foregoing right of action established by the Competition
Law.
E. ENFORCEMENT
As the agency responsible for enforcing the Competition Law, the
Commission has broad investigative and enforcement powers. It may in-
stitute administrative proceedings on its own initiative and, at the request
of third parties, investigate and resolve such cases, and enforce its orders
through administrative penalties. It may also bring cases of a criminal
nature to the attention of the public prosecutor or issue its own advisory
opinions.8 3
80. Competition Law, art. 34.
81. Id. arts. 35, 37.
82. Id. art. 38.
83. Id. arts. 24, 37.
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VII. PERU
A. LEGISLATION AND SCOPE
Peru's competition policy is governed by Decree No. 701 of November
5, 1991 (Decree 701), which "is intended to eliminate the monopolistic,
controlling and restrictive practices affecting free competition in goods
production and commercialization and service delivery, allowing thus free
enterprise to develop in the best interests of users." 84
B. REGULATED CONDUCT
Decree 701 prohibits acts or behaviors that constitute abuse of a domi-
nant market position or limit, restrain, or distort free competition.8 5 Acts
of abuse of a dominant position include: (1) the unjustified refusal to sat-
isfy demand for purchase or acquisition of goods or services; and (2) the
application of discriminatory terms for similar services that place some
competitors at a disadvantage with regards to others.86
Anticompetitive practices include the following:
(a) direct or indirect collusion among competitors to fix prices or other
terms of trade;
(b) division of the market or supply sources;
(c) application of production quotas;
(d) agreement upon product quality when it does not relate to techni-
cal standards;
(e) application in business practices of discriminatory terms for similar
services which place some competitors at a disadvantage with regards to
others; and
(f) collusion for limits or controls on production, technical develop-
ment, or investment.8 7
C. MERGER CONTROLS
With the exception of the electricity sector, Peru has not enacted legis-
lation regulating mergers, acquisitions, or other economic concentrations.
The Electricity Sector Antitrust Law of 1997 requires that companies en-
gaged in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity obtain
the approval of the Commission on Free Competition (INDECOPI) prior
to consummating a merger, acquisition, or other concentration transac-
tion if the parties to the transaction jointly control 15 percent of the rele-
vant market if the transaction is horizontal (that is, among competitors),
or 5 percent of any of the relevant markets if the transaction is vertical
(that is, among parties at different levels of the production-transmission-
84. Contra Las Practicas Monopolicas, Controlistas y Restrictivas de la Libre Com-
petencia, Legislative Decree No. 701 of Nov. 7, 1991, art. 1 (Peru).
85. Id. art. 3.
86. Id. art. 5.
87. Id. art. 6.
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distribution chain). 88 A transaction requiring approval that is carried out
without approval has no legal effect, and may result in fines of up to 10




INDECOPI is empowered to impose the following fines for abuse of
dominant position and other anticompetitive practices prohibited by De-
cree 701:
(a) a fine of up to 1,000 Unidades Impositivas Tributarias (UITs) (ap-
proximately US$898,550), provided that it does not exceed 10 percent of
gross sales or income of the violator in the period immediately preceding
INDECOPI's decision;
(b) if the violation is determined to be very serious, a fine greater than
1,000 UITs, provided it does not exceed 10 percent of gross sales or in-
come of the violator in the period immediately preceding INDECOPI's
decision; and
(c) each of the firms' legal representatives or directors may be fined up
to 100 UITs (approximately US$89,850) to the extent they are found lia-
ble for the violations committed.90
In addition, INDECOPI may issue interim orders to modify or termi-
nate infringing behavior, and impose fines from 10 to 100 UITs (approxi-
mately US$8,900 to US$89,850) for noncompliance with such measures,
and it may also initiate criminal proceedings in cases of certain egregious
violations.9 1
E. ENFORCEMENT
INDECOPI is responsible for ensuring compliance with the competi-
tion laws. It has both investigative and enforcement powers.92
VIII. VENEZUELA
A. LEGISLATION AND SCOPE
Competition legislation in Venezuela is comprised of the Law to Pro-
mote and Protect the Exercise of Free Competition of January 13, 1992
(the Antitrust Law), and the regulations, resolutions, and decisions issued
thereunder, particularly Regulation 1 of May 3, 1993, and Regulation 2 of
May 21, 1996. 93 The stated objective of the Antitrust Law is "to promote
88. Ley Antimonopolio y Antioligopolio del Sector Elctrico, Law No. 26876 of Nov.
17, 1997, art. 3 (Peru).
89. Id. art. 6.
90. Decree 701, art. 23. For 2003, a UIT (Unidad Impositiva Tributaria) is 3,100
Nuevos Soles.
91. Id. arts. 19, 21.
92. Id. art. 8.
93. Ley Para Promover y Proteger el Ejercicio de la Libre Competencia, published in
OFFICIAL GAZETrE No. 34.880 of Jan. 13, 1992 (Venez.) [hereinafter Antitrust
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and protect the exercise of free competition and efficiency to the benefit
of producers and consumers, and to prohibit monopolistic, oligarchic con-
duct and practices, and other measures that could impede, restrict, falsify,
or limit the enjoyment of economic freedom. '' 94 The Antitrust Law is
administered by the Office of the Superintendent for the Promotion and
Protection of Free Competition (ProCompetencia). 95
It should be noted that, pursuant to a directive in the new Constitution
adopted in 1999, the administration of President Hugo Chavez has
presented to Congress a bill comprising a new competition law.96 Com-
mentators have observed that, were the bill to be promulgated in its cur-
rent form, the new legislation would create a completely new
administrative structure, including a Competition Secretariat and a Com-
petition Defense Court, and require mandatory pre-merger notification
of all mergers, acquisitions, and other economic concentrations that ex-
ceed specified monetary thresholds.97 Although the 1999 Constitution re-
quired new antitrust legislation to be enacted no later than December 31,
2001, the bill has not yet passed into law, and at this writing, its future is
uncertain. Thus, the remainder of the present discussion addresses only
the Antitrust Law as now in effect.
B. REGULATED CONDUCT
The Antitrust Law broadly prohibits "[c]onduct, practices, agreements,
conventions, contracts, or decisions that impede, restrict, falsify, or limit
free competition, "98 and lists a number of specific types of restricted con-
duct, including: (1) attempting to obstruct the entry of firms, goods, or
services into market; (2) manipulating factors of production, distribution,
technological development, or investment in a manner harmful to free
competition; (3) agreements among members of trade associations, coop-
eratives, unions, and similar organizations to restrict competition among
themselves; (4) agreements or concerted conduct to fix prices, limit pro-
duction or distribution, divide markets, price discrimination, or tying ar-
rangements; and (5) the abuse of a dominant position.99
Law]; Reg. No. I de la Ley para Promover y Proteger el Ejercicio de la Libre
Competencia, Decree No. 2.775, published in OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 35.202 of
May 3, 1993 (Venez.) [hereinafter Reg. No. 1]; Reg. No. 2 de la Ley para Promover
y Proteger el Ejercicio de la Libre Competencia, Decree No. 1.311, published in
OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 35.963 of May 21, 1996 (Venez.) [hereinafter Reg. No. 2],
translated at http://www.procompetencia.gov.ve/legislacion.html.
94. Antitrust Law, art. 1.
95. Id. art. 19.
96. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZ. arts. 113, 114;
Projecto de Ley para la Promoci6n de la Libre Competencia y Eficiencia (submit-
ted to the Venezuelan Congress in 2000).
97. See Bruno Ciuffetelli, Venezuela: The New Legal Antitrust Framework, THE
BOMCHIL GROUP NEWSLETTER (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.bomchilgroup.
org/vendec02.html; Juan D. Alfonzo, The Draft Law on the Promotion of Free
Competition and Efficiency, GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, available at http://
www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ara/venezuela.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
98. Antitrust Law, art. 5.
99. Id. arts. 6-13.
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Pursuant to the authority granted by the Antitrust Law,100 in 1993, the
executive branch issued Regulation No. 1, which identified conduct that
is generally permissible, such as agreements under (4) above among non-
competitors and certain de minimus conduct, and authorized ProCom-
petencia to issue temporary authorizations and global exceptions to the
prohibitions against anticompetitive conduct set out in the Antitrust Law.
ProCompetencia may authorize temporary exceptions to the Antitrust
Law in specific cases where it takes the view that the anticompetitive im-
pact of the conduct in question is not significant and that such conduct
has other aspects that are beneficial to the economy. 0 1 In no event, how-
ever, may authorizations be granted for per se violations among competi-
tors, such as price fixing, limiting production, group boycotts, bid-rigging,
and market division.'0 2 Regulation No. 1 authorizes ProCompetencia to
grant global exceptions with respect to specific categories of activities,
such as: (1) the uniform application of standard terms and conditions of
trade; (2) joint research and development; (3) exclusive supply or
purchase agreements; and (4) franchise agreements. 10 3 Pursuant to that
authorization, ProCompetencia published global exceptions applicable to
exclusive distribution and supply arrangements 0 4 and franchise agree-
ments' 0 5 that, in each case, comply with the minimum standards and limi-
tations established in the respective resolution.
C. MERGER CONTROLS
The Venezuelan competition rules governing mergers, acquisitions,
joint ventures, and other economic concentrations are embodied in Arti-
cle 11 of the Antitrust Law, Regulation No. 2 of 1996, and resolutions
issued by ProCompetencia in 1997 and 1999, which contain filing instruc-
tions and evaluation guidelines, respectively.1 0 6 Unlike many jurisdic-
tions, Venezuela does not require mandatory notification of
transactions.10 7 Regulation No. 2 does establish, however, a threshold
below which transactions are not reviewable, which is currently set at a
combined total annual business volume of the parties to the transaction
100. Id. art. 18.
101. Reg. No. 1 de la Ley para Promover y Proteger el Ejercicio de la Libre Corn-
petencia, Decree No. 2.775, art. 10, published in OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 35.202 of
May 3, 1993 (Venez.).
102. Id. art 7.
103. Id. art 16.
104. Res. No. SPPLC/036-95 of Aug. 28, 1995, published in OFFICIAL GAZETTE No.
35.801 (Venez.).
105. Res. No. SPPLC/038-99 of July 9, 1999, published in OFFICIAL GAZETTE SUPPLE-
MENT No. 5.431 (Venez.).
106. Res. No. SPPLC/0006-97 of Apr. 17, 1997, published in OFFICIAL GAZETTE No.
36.209 (Venez.); Res. No. SPPLC/039-99 of July 9, 1999, published in OFFICIAL
GAZETTE No. 36.819 (Venez.).
107. This is the case under the current Antitrust Law. As noted above, however, the
reform bill before Congress would, among many other changes, introduce a
mandatory filing requirement for transactions that exceed the monetary and other
criteria that would be established by the law.
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of 120,000 Tax Units (approximately US$1,457,700). 10 8 In practice, how-
ever, parties to large or potentially controversial transactions typically
will elect to file a prior notification with ProCompetencia, in view of the
agency's statutory authority to impose fines ex post facto on the parties to
a transaction ProCompetencia subsequently determines to be violative of
the Antitrust Law, and even to order the complete or partial unwinding
of the transaction.
The standards by which ProCompetencia will evaluate the transaction
are spelled out in considerable detail in the agency's 1999 resolution dis-
cussed above. 109 ProCompetencia has up to four months from the filing
date to rule, and may approve the transaction without qualification, ap-
prove it subject to certain conditions, or reject it.110
If the parties to a merger decide to submit a notification, they must
submit sufficient information for ProCompetencia to determine whether
the transaction will have anticompetitive effects in the Venezuelan mar-
ket. This information includes: (1) the names of the parties; (2) detailed
information about the underlying transaction; (3) a description of the rel-
evant markets involved; (4) the parties' sales volumes and market shares;
and (5) the names of major competitors. I1 The parties must also provide
ProCompetencia with a description of barriers to entry into the relevant
markets, the price structure of the relevant markets, and information
about raw materials, products, and industrial processes.' 12
D. SANCTIONS
Article 49 of the Antitrust Law provides for sanctions for antitrust vio-
lations. ProCompetencia can impose fines of up to 10 percent of the
value of the violator's sales. This quantity can be raised to 20 percent,
and in the case of repeat offenders, the fine will be raised to 40 percent.
E. ENFORCEMENT
ProCompetencia is responsible for monitoring and controlling the
practices that impede or restrict competition. Its power includes the right
to resolve matters, conduct investigations, determine the existence or
nonexistence of prohibited practices of conduct, adopt necessary preven-
tive measures, and issue opinions.1 13
108. Reg. No. 2 de la Ley para Promover y Proteger el Ejercicio de la Libre Com-
petencia, Decree No. 1.311, art. 2, published in OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 35.963 of
May 21, 1996 (Venez.); Res. No. SPPLC/14-96 of May 24, 1996, published in OFFI-
CIAL GAZETTE No. 36.000 (Venez.). A Tax Unit for 2003 is equal to Bs.19,400.
109. Res. No. SPPLC/039-99.
110. THE GLOBAL MERGER NOTIFICATION HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 864.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Ley Para Promover y Proteger el Ejercicio de la Libre Competencia, art. 29, pub-
lished in OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 34.880 of Jan. 13, 1992 (Venez.).
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ARGENTINA
Regulated Conduct Merger Controls Sanctions
to the extent restricts, or is
intended to restrict compe-
tition or constitutes abuse
of a dominant position:
" fixing, agreement, or
manipulation of the price
of goods or services, or
the exchange of informa-
tion for the same purpose
or having the same effect;
" establishing obligations to
limit production, process-
ing, distribution, purchase
or marketing of goods or
the quantity, volume, or
frequency of services;




" agreement or coordina-
tion of bids in auctions or
competitive bidding pro-
cedures;
" concerted action to limit
or control technical
development or invest-
ments for the production
or marketing of goods
and services;
" impeding or excluding
third parties from enter-
ing or remaining in any
market;
" fixing, imposition or prac-
tice, in concert with com-
petitors or individually, in
any manner, of prices and
conditions for the pur-
chase or sale of goods,
services or production;
" controlling a markets for
goods or services,
through agreements to
limit or control research
and development or the
production of goods or
performance of services,
or to impede investments
in the production or dis-
tribution of goods and
services;
" Notification required if the






" acquiror already holds
more than 50% of the
stock of the target.
o the acquisition of a single
Argentine entity by a sin-
gle foreign entity that did
not previously own assets
or shares in other Argen-
tine companies
o acquiror has not com-
pleted any acquisition in
the same market within
the preceding 12




within the preceding 36




" Failure to notify renders
the transaction null and
void and expose the parties
to a fine of up to
PSI,000,000 (approximately
US$347,000) per day until
compliance.
" Tribunal has 45 days from
notification (i) to approve
the transaction, (ii) to con-
dition the transaction on
compliance with certain
requirements or (iii) to pro-
hibit the transaction. If the
Tribunal does none of
these, the transaction is
deemed approved.
" Cease and desist orders





" Fulfillment of conditions
to neutralize the distor-
tive effects on competi-
tion
" Fines of up to
P$1,000,000 (approxi-
mately US$347,000) per
day for those who con-
tinue to infringe.
* U.S. dollar equivalents based on currency conversion rates in effect in January
2004.
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Regulated Conduct Merger Controls Sanctions
" subordinating the sale of
a good or rendering of a
service for the acquisition
of another;
" conditioning a sale or
purchase upon an under-
taking not to use,
acquire, sell or supply
goods or services pro-
duced, processed, distrib-
uted, or marketed by
third parties;
" imposing discriminatory
conditions, not based on
customary market prac-
tice, on the acquisition or
disposition of goods and
services;
" unjustified refusal to
accept firm offers for the
sale or purchase of goods
and services on market
terms and conditions;
" suspension of a dominant
monopolistic service to a
provider of public ser-
vices or public interest;
" selling products below
cost, without a basis in
customary market prac-
tice, in order to eliminate
a competitor in the mar-
ketplace or to damage
the image, assets or
brand value of providers
of goods or services.
2004]
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" to fix prices and condi-
tions for the sale of a cer-
tain product or service in
collusion with competi-
tors;
" to obtain or otherwise
procure the adoption of
uniform or concerted bus-
iness practices among
competitors;
" to apportion markets for
products or services, or
for sources of raw materi-
als or intermediary prod-
ucts;
" to limit or restrain mar-
ket access by new compa-
nies;
" to create barriers to the
establishment, operation,
or development of a com-
petitor company or a sup-
plier, purchaser, or
financier of a certain
product or service;
" to bar access of competi-
tors to sources of raw
materials, equipment or
technology sources, or to
channels of distribution
thereof;
" to require or grant exclu-
sivity in mass media
advertising;
" to agree in advance on
prices or advantages in
public or administrative
biddings;
" to control the market for
a certain product or ser-
vice by means of agree-
ments to limit or control
technological research
and development or the
production of products or
services, or to limit
investments in the pro-
duction of products and
services or the distribu-
tion thereof;
" Notification required if
o combined entity would
have control of 20% or
more of the relevant mar-
ket, or
0 any of the parties has
annual worldwide gross






" Filing required not later
than 15 days after the date
of signing of the "first bind-
ing document".
" Failure to file may result in
fines ranging from 60,000





" CADE has 120 days from
the date of filing to issue its
approval or denial of the
transaction, during the first
60 days of which CADE
receives advisory opinions
from SDE and SEAE.
" If approval denied after
transaction consummated,
CADE may order measures
to cure the economic harm
caused by the transaction,
including the partial or
complete unwinding of the
transaction.
" For companies - fines
ranging from 1-30% of
gross pretax revenue
" For managers - fine from
10-15% of the fine im-
posed on the company
" For individuals - fines




" Half-page publication of
the summary sentence in
court-appointed paper
" Company's partial discon-
tinuance
" Annotation of the viola-
tor on the Brazilian Con-
sumer Protection List
* U.S. dollar equivalents based on currency conversion rates in effect in January
2004.
LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION LAW
BRAZIL
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Regulated Conduct Merger Controls Sanctions
" to impose prices or other
terms or conditions of
sale on distributors,
retailers or representa-
tives of products or ser-
vices;
" to discriminate against
purchasers or suppliers of
a certain product or ser-
vice by establishing price
differentials or discrimi-
natory conditions of sale;
" to refuse to sell a certain




" to sell products below
cost unjustifiably;
" to condition the sale of
one product or service on
the acquisition of
another.
2004] LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION LAW
CHILE
* U.S. dollar equivalents based on currency conversion rates in effect in January
2004.
Regulated Conduct Merger Controls Sanctions
To the extent tending to - No specific filing require- 9 Nullification of any act,
impede free competition, ments. contract, arrangement, or
" conduct relating to pro- * Transactions with signifi- agreement deemed to be
duction, such as quotas, cant anti-competitive in violation of free compe-
reductions or suspensions; effects may be deemed tition
" conduct relating to trans- illegal and subject to sanc- * Disqualification from serv-
portation; tions, including fines, ing in labor or trade
• conduct relating to mar- remedial measures, and unions
keting or distribution, even criminal prosecution. e Fines up to 10,000
wholesale or retail, such For this reason, parties to monthly tax units (approx.
as quotas, market division, large business combina- US $518,800)*
and exclusive distribution tions, particularly in criti-
arrangements; cal economic sectors,
" conduct involving the occasionally seek advisory
determination of prices of opinions from the anti-
goods or services; trust authorities.
" conduct affecting the right
to work or the freedom of
workers to organize,
assemble, or negotiate col-
lectively; and
" generally, any arbitrary
act or agreement having
the purpose of eliminat-
ing, restricting, or imped-
ing competition.
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COLOMBIA
Regulated Conduct Merger Controls Sanctions
a. contracts, agreements,
concerted practices, or con-
scious parallel conduct
among two or more enter-
prises if they have as their
purpose or effect:
" fixing prices directly or
indirectly;
" establishing discrimina-
tory sale or marketing
conditions for third par-
ties;




" assigning, dividing or
restricting sources of sup-
ply of resources; (vi) lim-
iting technical develop-
ment;
" conditioning the supply of
a product upon the
acceptance of additional
obligations extraneous to
the purpose of the trans-
action;
" withholding production of
goods or services or
affecting their level of
production;
" collusion or price fixing
in bidding or allocating
contract awards.
b. violation of consumer
protection rules regarding
advertising.
c. influencing an enterprise
to increase the prices of its
goods or services or to
desist from lowering such
prices,
d. refusal to sell to an
enterprise or discriminate
against an enterprise in
retaliation against its pricing
policies and
e. abuse of a dominant
position in a market, as evi-
denced by, inter alia, preda-
tory pricing, price
discrimination or tying.
" Notification required if
" the combined business
would represent more
than 20% of the relevant
market, measured in
terms of annual sales for
the year preceding the
year of the transaction, or
O their combined assets as
of the date of the trans-




" Filing must be made before




does not object within 30
days from filing.
" Cease and desist orders
" Fines up to the equiv-
alent of 2000 MMW
(approximately
US$242,600)
" Fines up to the equiv-
alent of 300 MMW
(approximately
US$36,400) upon manag-




* U.S. dollar equivalents based on currency conversion rates in effect in January
2004.
LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION LAW
MEXICO










practices (prohibited only if
the actor has "substantial
power" over the "relevant
market."): agreements or
combinations the purpose
or effect of which is to
unduly impede market
access to third parties or
give exclusive advantages to





obligations not to com-
pete;
" resale price controls;
" tying arrangements
" conditioning sales or
other transactions on
obligations not to deal
with certain third parties;
" refusal to deal with cer-
tain parties;
" concerted action to pres-
sure or retaliate against
customers or suppliers.
* Notification required if
° transaction value exceeds
12 million times the daily




° transaction involves the
accumulation of more
than 35% of the assets or
shares of a person or
enterprise with assets or
sales exceeding 12 million
DMW (approximately
US$48,366,000); or
° transaction involves (i)
persons or enterprises
whose combined assets or
yearly sales exceed 48
million DMW (approxi-
mately US$193,463,000)
and (ii) an accumulation




" Notification must be filed
prior to closing of transac-
tion.
" The Commission has a
period of 45 calendar days
from the date of the notice
or from such later date on
which any additional
requested information was
received, in which to
respond. If the Commis-
sion does not respond dur-
ing such 45-day period the
transaction will be deemed
approved.
" Order to suspend, correct
or eliminate the practice
" Fine of up to 7,500 DMW
(approximately
US$30,200)
" Fines of up to 225,000
DMW (approximately
US$906,900) for having
engaged in relative anti-
competitive practices





" Fines of up to 10%
annual sales of infringer
* U.S. dollar equivalents based on currency conversion rates in effect in January
2004.
2004]
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PERU
Regulated Conduct Merger Controls Sanctions
a. Abuse of dominant posi-
tion:
" unjustified refusal to sat-
isfy demand for purchase
or acquisition of goods or
services
" application of discrimina-
tory terms for similar ser-
vices that place some
competitors at a disad-




" direct or indirect collu-
sion among competitors
to fix prices or other
terms of trade;
" division of the market or
supply sources;
" application of production
quotas;
" agreement upon product
quality when it does not
relate to technical stan-
dards;
" application in business
practices of discrimina-
tory terms for similar ser-
vices which place some
competitors at a disad-
vantage with regards to
others; and




" No merger controls except
in electricity sector.
" Companies in electricity
sector require INDECOPI
approval prior to closing if
the parties to the transac-
tion jointly control
O 15% of the relevant mar-
ket if the transaction is
horizontal (i.e., among
competitors);
° 5% of any of the relevant
markets if the transaction
is vertical (i.e., among




" A transaction requiring
approval that is carried out
without approval has no
legal effect, and may result
in fines of up to 10% of the
sales or gross revenues of
the violator(s) for the prior
year.





For serious fines, a fine
greater than 1,000 UITs
(approximately
US$898,550)
Fines up to 100 UTIs
(approximately
US$89,850) for legal rep-
resentatives or directors
2004] LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION LAW
VENEZUELA
Regulated Conduct Merger Controls Sanctions
Conduct and agreements * Filing is voluntary. Monetary Sanctions
that limit free competi- In no event is a transac- depending on the form
tion,including: tion subject to review if and scope of the restric-
" attempting to obstruct the the parties' combined tion; the size of the mar-
entry of firms, goods, or total annual business vol- ket affected; the market
services into market; ume is less than 120,000 share of the corresponding
" manipulating factors of Tax Units (approximately person subject to law; the
production, distribution, US$1,457,700).* impact of the restriction
technological development If notification is given, of competition on other
or investment in a manner ProCompetencia has up to actual or potential com-
harmful to free competi- 4 months from the filing petitors, on other parts of
tion; date to rule, and may the economic process, and
" agreements among mem- approve the transaction on consumers and users;
bers of trade associations, without qualification, the duration of the restric-
cooperatives, unions and approve it subject to cer- tion on consumers and
similar organizations to tain conditions, or reject users; the duration of the
restrict competition it. restriction on free compe-
among themselves; tition; and the frequency
" agreements or concerted of repeat offenses.
conduct to fix prices, limit
production or distribution,
divide markets, price dis-
crimination or tying
arrangements;
" abuse of dominant posi-
tion.
* U.S. dollar equivalents based on currency conversion rates in effect in January
2004.
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